On 2 October 2026 I found a scrambled PowerShell file on a server I run. I did not run it. I read it, then I read the second file it was built to download. This is that record, in the order things actually happened, written so you do not need a malware background to follow it.
The answer people want first. These two files do not contain stolen passwords, cookies, keys, wallet files, or a list of what was taken. The first file only starts a hidden download. The second file only unpacks about 284 kilobytes of encrypted program code and starts that code inside a normal-looking Windows program: Microsoft Edge Update, or rundll32.exe if Edge Update is missing. I pulled every readable piece of text out of that encrypted program. There is no address, no password, and no file list. As of 2 October 2026, public reports also do not tie foxdale.cc or this file’s hash to a named stealer.
So there are only two honest outcomes, and only the server’s own logs can tell them apart:
- The hidden download never reached foxdale.cc. The bad file was sitting on disk. Nothing was taken.
- Edge Update or rundll32 did start. The encrypted program ran. The sample never says what it collected, so treat every secret on that server as exposed and change them from a different, clean computer.
The story in one minute
Someone created an empty GitHub account, pushed a long PowerShell file, and let a trusted download network (jsDelivr) hand that file out. The file’s real job is four lines at the end. Everything above that is junk, written so a quick search looks busy and finds nothing.
Those four lines start 32-bit PowerShell with no window, download a second script from a brand-new domain, foxdale.cc, and run whatever comes back without saving it as a new file. The second script then hides an encrypted program inside Edge Update. From the outside it can look like a Microsoft updater. It is not one.
A throwaway GitHub account
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jsDelivr serves the first script (file 119-73c4846d6ec9)
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Hidden PowerShell downloads file two (install.ps1 on foxdale.cc)
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File two starts Edge Update, paused
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About 284 KB of encrypted code runs inside that process
When it was set up
- 24 September 2026. GitHub user
04FB-fFis created. Empty profile. No name, no company, no biography. - 30 September 2026, 15:27 UTC.
foxdale.ccis registered. About 25 minutes later its nameservers move to Cloudflare. - 1 October 2026, 20:11 UTC. The first script is committed. Another repository on the same account is emptied the same day.
- 2 October 2026. I read the copy on the server and the second script. Neither one was executed.
Six days from an empty account to a domain, then one day to the file. That is a disposable setup: create it, push a script, let a trusted site fetch it, delete the file once someone notices.
File one: a downloader wearing 2,575 lines of noise
On disk the injected file has no real name. It is 119-73c4846d6ec9, about 238 kilobytes, 2,575 lines. Its SHA-256 is 6ecba8d846b8ceff6ad3bc5eba30f7428e7e34fa8cdbdd60ed099cef2acd5896.
The top of the file is a wall of functions with random names. Many return immediately. Others compare a value to itself, which can never be true, and then do nothing with the result. Comments mention hidden webhooks and sockets. I opened those strings. They are not files on the server. They are bait.
The real behavior is at the end, and I could check it by recovering the short hidden strings:
- It builds a web address for
install.ps1on a host underfoxdale.cc. - It finds 32-bit PowerShell under
C:\Windows\SysWOW64by asking the filesystem, so the program’s name never sits in the file as plain text. A search for “powershell” in the raw file misses it. - It starts that program with no window, no profile, and the execution policy bypassed.
- The hidden program downloads the address and runs the response in memory. The first script then exits.
I am not pasting the original file, and I am not pasting a version someone could run. What follows is the behavior, not a copy.
File: 119-73c4846d6ec9 Lines: 2,575. Size: about 238 KB. Delivery, defanged: cdn.jsdelivr[.]net/gh/04FB-fF/c19e1173-a40b-4198-b705-b85466f6cde0/119-73c4846d6ec9 What it does: 1. Find 32-bit PowerShell under C:\Windows\SysWOW64 2. Start it with no window 3. Download hxxps://a611-ce4cac3252f6[.]foxdale[.]cc/install.ps1 4. Run that text in memory 5. Exit It does not open a password store. The thousands of lines above this are noise.
The download-and-run commands are also hidden. The script asks PowerShell to find them by a partial name. A defender who only searches the file for the usual command names will not see them. That is the point of the disguise.
The shape matches loaders described in early-2026 reporting on ClearFake and ClickFix: a days-old GitHub account, a random repository name, and a pull through jsDelivr into hidden PowerShell. I am not saying this sample is that group. The file never signs its author’s name. The delivery kit looks the same.
Who published it
The jsDelivr path points at GitHub user 04FB-fF, user id 333444134. The public profile has no name, no location, no biography, and no followers. GitHub’s own line is “Joined last week.” The account was created on 24 September 2026.
The hosting account as I captured it: four public repositories, a default picture, and a join date of last week.
The repository that holds this file is c19e1173-a40b-4198-b705-b85466f6cde0. It contains one file, added in commit ad1b2194a9f30df099b615ac03c0dcaf905ba957 on 1 October 2026 at 20:11 UTC. The commit message is only “Create 119-73c4846d6ec9”. The author line is 04FB-fF <e438e@lazy-park-keeper.com>. I searched that mailbox domain. It does not name a person. The same address is reused on the account’s other commits.
When I looked, the account had four public repositories. All of them have random names, no description, and no stars.
| Repository | What was in it |
|---|---|
c19e1173-a40b-4198-b705-b85466f6cde0 | This loader, about 238 KB, added 1 October 2026. |
3effbe0b-dc54-4919-a42c-0dc86dfc1122 | Another script of similar size, file 4a49f8d9-ab3a-49a6-83c8-7e58bfb8fe1e, about 219 KB. |
045D-C-Df-1907dC-F0Bc-8149-F6 | Emptied the same day. The last commit deletes a payload named 8cC1-45Bb-FBD. |
9-029D-Fb4cA6-c476eD0-9E14-E-B | Empty. |
The scrambled variable names and the dead math are the output of an automated crypter, a program that disguises another program. Nobody typed these 2,575 lines by hand. Public data does not connect the account to a real person.
The domain is a costume
foxdale.cc was one day old when the GitHub commit called it. It does not host a website of its own. The homepage sends visitors to https://apnews.com. The person who bought the domain is hidden behind a privacy service. The machine that sends the redirect is hidden behind Cloudflare.
Borrowing the Associated Press address does not mean the operator works with AP News, and it does not mean the operator is in the United States. AP News is a US newsroom. The operator used a trusted name the same way they used jsDelivr and GitHub. I found no registration detail, profile, or commit that ties this account to AP News or to a US person. foxdale.com and foxdale.in are different sites on different infrastructure. Nothing in these records ties them to foxdale.cc.
Who registered it
The public registration record lists Verisign as the .cc registry, id 210306578_DOMAIN_CC-VRSN. The registrar is Spaceship, Inc. (IANA 3862). Abuse mail is abuse@spaceship.com. Their privacy contact form is here. I sent the abuse report and kept a copy.
| Field | What I recorded |
|---|---|
| Created | 30 September 2026, 15:27 UTC |
| Nameservers changed | 30 September 2026, 15:52 UTC, about 25 minutes later |
| Expires | 30 September 2027 |
| Registrar | Spaceship, Inc. (IANA 3862) |
| Status | clientTransferProhibited, still in the add period |
| DNSSEC | Unsigned |
| Registrant | Privacy service: WITHHELD FOR PRIVACY LLC, Lewes, Delaware. Name and email are redacted. |
| Nameservers | ben.ns.cloudflare.com and frida.ns.cloudflare.com |
The report I sent to Spaceship: domain dates, the malicious host, the jsDelivr address, and the GitHub account.
The homepage is a redirect. The payload is a side door.
I followed the redirects instead of trusting the page title.
http://foxdale.ccanswers 301 and sends the browser tohttps://foxdale.cc/.https://foxdale.cc/andhttps://www.foxdale.cc/answer 302 and send the browser to https://apnews.com.- The redirect body is one plain sentence: “Found. Redirecting to https://apnews.com.” The header
X-Powered-By: Expressmeans a small Node.js program is generating it. Cloudflare marks the responseDYNAMIC, so it is built on each visit, not stored as a saved page. - Any other path I tried —
/foo,/robots.txt,/favicon.ico— stops at a Cloudflare “Just a moment…” check and never reaches that Node program.
The malware did not use that front door. It used a separate name, a611-ce4cac3252f6.foxdale.cc, and the path /install.ps1. A visitor who types the domain into a browser sees a news site. A script that already knows the long hostname gets the second file.
What the DNS actually shows
The public addresses for the domain are 104.21.76.161 and 172.67.197.118. Both belong to Cloudflare (AS13335). They are the proxy, not the computer running the Express redirect, and not the computer that served install.ps1. That origin address is hidden. There is no mail server, no TXT record, and no IPv6 address. The A records expire after 300 seconds.
There is also a wildcard. A name I invented, zz-not-real-9f3a.foxdale.cc, resolves to the same two Cloudflare addresses, and so do www, mail, api, and the other common labels I checked. The malware hostname rides that wildcard. It does not need a DNS record of its own.
One oddity belongs to the computer I investigated from, not to the domain. Plain DNS queries for foxdale.cc to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, and 9.9.9.9 came back as 127.81.0.1 and 127.81.0.2. google.com was left alone. DNS-over-HTTPS returned the real Cloudflare addresses. Nothing was listening on those local addresses. After the first successful requests, TLS from this PC to Cloudflare started failing. The redirect itself was already confirmed both on this machine and from an outside fetch.
File two: camouflage, then a locked box
I saved the downloaded install.ps1 as install.ps.txt and read it as text. It is 64,672 lines and 6,300,886 bytes, about 6.3 megabytes. A search of the raw file finds no web address. Same idea as file one, done more heavily: numbers that cancel out, branches that never run, strings built one character at a time.
Following only the instruction that actually runs, there are three layers.
Layer one hides the next script from a scanner
The file ends by rebuilding a short command that runs a decoded block. The decoding exists so Windows’ script scanner does not see the next script as plain text. I recovered that next script far enough to read it. I did not save a copy that can be launched.
Layer two starts a familiar program and steps inside it
The recovered script turns off error messages, then holds one large encoded blob. It unpacks that blob into about 284,229 bytes. It finds a few Windows functions by a fingerprint of each name, so the names themselves are not written in the file.
What those calls add up to:
- It looks for
MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exeunderC:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\. The folder names are split up so they are not one obvious string. If that file is missing, it uses 32-bitC:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exeinstead. - It starts the chosen program paused, before that program does its normal work.
- It places the unpacked bytes inside that process and lets the program continue.
- If setup fails, it closes the program it started. Either way it wipes the buffer it was holding.
The result is a malicious program running inside a process whose name is Edge Update or rundll32. This step does not drop a new suspicious file on disk. The parent is the thing to look for: hidden 32-bit PowerShell, started from SysWOW64.
File: install.ps1, saved locally as install.ps.txt Lines: 64,672. Size: 6,300,886 bytes. No website address appears in the raw text. What it does: 1. Rebuild a hidden script so a scanner does not see it as plain text 2. Unpack about 284,229 bytes of encrypted program code 3. Try MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe in C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\ 4. If that file is missing, use C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe 5. Start the chosen program paused 6. Place the encrypted program inside it and let it continue 7. If setup fails, close the program it started 8. Wipe the buffer The inner 284 KB has no readable website, password, or file list.
Layer three is encrypted, and I left it that way
I unpacked the blob the second script injects. The first bytes are machine code, not a normal Windows program with a readable header. I extracted every run of readable text, including text stored as wide characters. The longest fragments are about a dozen characters, and they are garbage. There is no URL, no password field, no wallet name, no browser profile path, and no command.
The second file’s visible job is delivery and camouflage. The program that would collect data, open a remote session, or do both is still encrypted. Naming that inner program would mean running it, or breaking an encryption layer I chose not to attack. I am not publishing a way to decode it.
What was stolen
I searched the raw text and the unpacked layers for passwords, cookies, wallet names, browser profile paths, SSH keys, cloud tokens, mailboxes, screenshots, and any upload of a directory listing. None of that is in the samples. There is no victim list and no captured secret.
What the files prove is narrower than “they stole X”:
- On 24 September 2026 they created GitHub user
04FB-fF. On 1 October 2026 they published a 2,575-line PowerShell loader, GitHub size 237,900 bytes. - On 30 September 2026 they registered
foxdale.cc, pointed the homepage at the Associated Press site, and put the real second file on a random hostname under the same domain. - They arranged for the first file to be fetched through jsDelivr. On the server, that file was
119-73c4846d6ec9. - If that file runs, it starts hidden 32-bit PowerShell and tells it to download
install.ps1and run the response in memory. The loader then exits. It does not itself read a password store. - If
install.ps1runs, it unpacks about 284 kilobytes of encrypted code and starts that code inside Edge Update or rundll32. The unpacked program has no readable text.
That is remote code dressed up as a Microsoft process. It is not, in the evidence I have, a finished theft with names of files or accounts. Loaders shipped this way in other public cases are often followed by an information stealer or a remote-access tool. That is context from other incidents. It is not a finding from this server, and the sample does not support a family name.
| If this happened | Then |
|---|---|
| Hidden PowerShell never ran, or it never reached foxdale.cc | Nothing was stolen. The file was only present. |
| Edge Update or rundll32 did start | Treat passwords, keys, tokens, and files on that server as exposed. The sample does not name which ones. Change them from a different, clean computer. |
The checks are ordinary logs: a hidden 32-bit powershell.exe under SysWOW64, a child MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe or rundll32.exe, and a DNS or proxy request for a611-ce4cac3252f6.foxdale.cc or for the jsDelivr path of user 04FB-fF.
If you find the same thing
- Take the computer off the network, or at least stop it from opening new outbound connections, until you know which of the two outcomes you are in.
- Block
foxdale[.]ccand the jsDelivr path for user04FB-fF. - Search process and PowerShell logs for the hidden 32-bit host, then for a child Edge Update or rundll32.
- Look for scheduled tasks, Run keys, new services, and new local users created at the same time.
- Change every secret that was stored on that computer. Do it from a machine that did not run the script.
- Report GitHub user
04FB-fFfor malware hosting. Report the domain to abuse@spaceship.com, and to Cloudflare if the nameservers are still theirs.
If the logs show no child process and no request to that domain, the script was present and did not finish. Keep the file for the report. Do not run it to see what happens.
Values worth searching for
Dots in hostnames are written so these are not live links.
| Kind | Value |
|---|---|
| Domain | foxdale[.]cc |
| Payload host | a611-ce4cac3252f6[.]foxdale[.]cc path /install.ps1 |
| Stage-one delivery | cdn.jsdelivr[.]net/gh/04FB-fF/c19e1173-a40b-4198-b705-b85466f6cde0/119-73c4846d6ec9 |
| GitHub account | 04FB-fF (id 333444134), created 2026-09-24 |
| Commit identity | e438e@lazy-park-keeper[.]com |
| Stage-one SHA-256 | 6ecba8d846b8ceff6ad3bc5eba30f7428e7e34fa8cdbdd60ed099cef2acd5896 |
| Stage-one size | 2,575 lines; about 238 KB; GitHub object 237,900 bytes |
| GitHub commit | ad1b2194a9f30df099b615ac03c0dcaf905ba957, 1 October 2026, 20:11 UTC |
| Stage-two file | install.ps1, 64,672 lines, 6,300,886 bytes |
| Code placed in Edge Update or rundll32 | 284,229 bytes, encrypted, no readable strings |
| Cloudflare answers | 104.21.76.161, 172.67.197.118 (AS13335). Origin IP hidden. |
| Registry id | 210306578_DOMAIN_CC-VRSN |
| Processes to hunt | Hidden 32-bit PowerShell from SysWOW64, then MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe or rundll32.exe |
What this article is. The record of one server, two files, and the public registration data around them, examined on 2 October 2026 without executing the malware. It is not a reconstruction of the crypter, not a copy of the encrypted program, and not proof of a named criminal.
Registration data from Spaceship’s public RDAP record for foxdale.cc. GitHub metadata from the public API for user 04FB-fF. Both malware files were read locally and were not executed.




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